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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 13-2485 & 13-2486 
___________ 
 
SHAWN RICHARD COUDRIET, 
      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONY J. VARDARO, Judge; BRIAN V. COLEMAN, Warden; GARY M. 
ALIZZEO, Attorney; JOHN RICTOR, Chief of Police; PAULA DIGIACOMO, A.D.A.; 
FRANCIS J. SCHULTZ, D.A.; SUSAN BERRIER, R.N.; MATTHEW LEWICKI, R.N.; 
MARK A. CASTEEL, M.D.; MICHAEL J. HERBIK, D.O.; TIM LEWIS, Warden; 
TRACE MCCRAKEN, Bail Bond Agent; MICHAEL ROSSI, Magistrate Judge; 
JAMIEE L. GASTER, Counselor; DEBRA HUSARCHIK, P.S.S.; GARY GALLUCCI, 
Psychologist; PETER SAAVEDRA, Psychiatrist 
__________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:11-cv-00185) 
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 7, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 18, 2013 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 Pro se Appellant Shawn Coudriet appeals the District Court’s orders granting 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss.  For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgments.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
I. 
 Coudriet is an inmate presently incarcerated at the Pennsylvania State Correctional 
Institution at Fayette (“SCI-Fayette”).  He filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 in the District Court against seventeen defendants, arising from his 2005 arrest and 
subsequent conviction in the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County, Pennsylvania. 
Coudriet brought claims against numerous officials involved in his arrest, conviction, and 
incarceration, alleging that he is innocent of the crimes and, therefore, the defendants 
violated his constitutional rights by conspiring to unlawfully convict and imprison him.  
He also brought claims against various medical professionals, claiming that they were 
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.  The Defendants filed motions to dismiss, 
which the District Court granted.  See Orders, ECF Nos. 160, 161, 183, 184, 185, 186. 
This appeal followed.
1
 
II. 
                                              
1
 Coudriet’s appeals from the orders entered April 10, 2013, are pending at C.A. No. 13-
2485, and his appeal from the order entered April 17, 2013, is pending at C.A. No. 13-
2486.  Additionally, because the District Court has now entered a final order, we have 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s November 30, 2012 orders, which Coudriet 
3 
 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s dismissal order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  To survive dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  This Court affirms a district 
court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim “only if, accepting all factual allegations as 
true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we 
determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the 
complaint.”  McGovern v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  We may 
summarily affirm if the appeal does not present a substantial question, and may do so on 
any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam). 
III. 
 Coudriet’s constitutional claims are broad in scope, beginning with the legal 
processes which led to his conviction, and detailing incidents that have occurred since he 
was incarcerated.  At the outset, we note that the applicable statute of limitations for 
Coudriet’s § 1983 claims is two years.  See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 
                                                                                                                                                  
prematurely appealed before a final order had been entered.  See C.A. Nos. 12-4515 and 
12-4516. 
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2009).  In this instance, Coudriet filed his complaint on August 26, 2011.
2
  Thus, barring 
any exceptions or tolling provision, claims that accrued prior to August 26, 2009, are 
time-barred.  Specifically, Coudriet claims that John Rictor, Chief of Police of Vernon 
Township, unlawfully arrested him at his home without a valid warrant and falsified the 
affidavit of probable cause.  We agree with the District Court’s construction of Coudriet’s 
complaint that his claims against Rictor are based upon illegal search and seizure, false 
arrest/imprisonment and selective enforcement.  These claims accrued in March and 
April 2005, when Coudriet’s DNA was seized and he was arrested and charged.  Thus, 
they are barred by the statute of limitations.  See, e.g., Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 
F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998) (false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrued on the 
night of the arrest); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(selective enforcement claim accrued when he was stopped by police officers for alleged 
traffic violation and arrested for suspected drug possession.).  Coudriet’s allegations that 
Warden Tim Lewis facilitated an assault against him by another inmate when he was first 
committed to the Crawford County Jail in May 2005 are also time-barred.
3
 
                                              
2
 Coudriet’s complaint was docketed by the court on September 1, 2011.  However, 
because Coudriet is a prisoner, he receives the benefit of the “prison mailbox rule.”  See 
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).  There is no evidence of when Coudriet gave 
his complaint to prison officials for mailing, or a post-marked date.  Accordingly, we use 
the date he signed his complaint, August 26, 2011.   
3
 Additionally, Coudriet agrees that the statute of limitations bars his claims against Gary 
Galluci and Debra Husarchik, mental health professionals at SCI-Fayette, asserting that 
they induced him to participate in a sexual offenders program that he was not legally 
required to attend.   
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 In addition to asserting time-barred claims, Coudriet brought claims against 
defendants who are not state actors under § 1983, or who are immune from suit.  In 
particular, Coudriet’s claims against Gary Alizzeo, his court-appointed attorney, fail 
under § 1983 because he is not a state actor.  See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 
318 (1981) (a court-appointed defense attorney is not a state actor for purposes of a § 
1983 action simply “by virtue of being an officer of the court . . . ”).  Moreover, Francis 
Schultz, the District Attorney of Crawford County, and Paula DiGiacomo, an Assistant 
District Attorney, are entitled to prosecutorial immunity.  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (state prosecuting attorney who acted within scope of his duties in 
initiating and pursuing criminal prosecution and in presenting state's case was immune 
from civil suit for damages for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights).
 4
  Similarly, 
Magistrate Judge Michael Rossi and Judge Anthony Vardaro of the Crawford County 
Court of Common Pleas are entitled to judicial immunity.  See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 
F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (“A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has 
absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.”) (citing Mireles 
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12(1991)).
5
  Finally, given the Judges’ judicial immunity, it follows 
                                              
4
 Coudriet claims that Schultz and DiGiacomo prosecuted him without probable cause, 
relied upon an invalid search warrant to collect his DNA, and enticed the victim to 
fabricate her testimony. 
5
 Coudriet claims that Magistrate Judge Rossi’s actions were illegal and unjust during his 
arraignment, bail hearing, and preliminary hearing, and he claims that Judge Vardaro was 
biased in presiding over his criminal case and subsequent PCRA hearing.  There are no 
allegations that the judges acted outside of their judicial capacity or in the absence of 
jurisdiction.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (a judge is immune 
6 
 
that Warden Lewis and Superintendent Brian Coleman are entitled to quasi-judicial 
immunity for Coudriet’s claims that he was illegally detained at SCI-Fayette pursuant to 
fraudulent Court Orders.  See Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782-83 (3d Cir. 2003) (it 
is well-settled that “action taken pursuant to a facially valid court order receives absolute 
immunity from § 1983 lawsuits for damages.”); see also Patterson v. Von Riesen, 999 
F.2d 1235, 1241 (8th Cir. 1993) (“a warden is absolutely immune from damages flowing 
from the fact of a prisoner's incarceration, when that incarceration occurs pursuant to a 
facially valid order of confinement.”).6     
 Turning to Coudriet’s Eighth Amendment claims of deliberate indifference to his 
medical needs, Coudriet claims that while he was at Crawford County Correctional 
Facility for a PCRA hearing, a fellow inmate poisoned him with acid-laced vanilla cake, 
and he was subsequently diagnosed with an impacted bowel.  He was treated at 
Meadville Medical Center.  Coudriet claims that he was misdiagnosed and that he should 
have undergone a CT scan, colonoscopy, and surgery.  When he returned to SCI-Fayette, 
he was prescribed medication, but he was not given an x-ray, which Coudriet claims 
would have shown that he needed surgery.  In the context of Eighth Amendment claims 
based on medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious 
                                                                                                                                                  
from liability for all actions taken in his or her judicial capacity, unless such action is 
taken in the absence of all jurisdiction). 
6
 Alternatively, Coudreit’s claims against Lewis and Coleman for illegal detention are 
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (civil action that would impugn a 
criminal conviction if successful cannot be maintained until that conviction is 
invalidated). 
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medical need.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).  A plaintiff may make a 
showing of deliberate indifference by establishing that the defendants “intentionally 
den[ied] or delay[ed] medical care.”  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009).  
However, “[w]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over 
the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess 
medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.”  U.S. ex 
rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., Pa., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Claims of negligence or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate 
indifference.  Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001).  Here, 
Coudriet’s claims demonstrate that he received medical care, but that he disagreed with 
the treatment.  This is insufficient for a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth 
Amendment.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (a prisoner’s 
disagreement with proper medical treatment does not imply a constitutional violation).
 7
 
 Coudriet also brought claims against Dr. Peter Saavedra, a psychiatrist, asserting 
that Dr. Saavedra fraudulently diagnosed him with paranoia, confined him against his 
will, and required him to take anti-psychotic medication for treatment of psychosis after 
the incident with the acid-laced vanilla cake.  In support of his motion to dismiss, Dr. 
                                              
7
 To the extent that Coudriet brought deliberate indifference claims against non-medical 
officials, including Warden Lewis and Superintendent Coleman, he has failed to state a 
claim.  See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236 (“[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) 
that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-
medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter 
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Saavedra submitted Coudriet’s file from the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and 
Appeals (“SOIGA”) to demonstrate that Coudriet failed to exhaust his claims against 
him.  The District Court converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary 
judgment and concluded that the records showed that Coudriet failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies and that Dr. Saavedra was entitled to summary judgment.  We 
agree.
8
  Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), inmates must exhaust their 
administrative remedies before filing a suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional 
conduct by prison officials.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  A prisoner must exhaust these 
remedies “in the literal sense”; no further avenues in the prison’s grievance process 
should be available.  Spruill, 372 F.3d at 232.  “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and not 
the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”  Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 
199, 218 (2007).  Here, the record shows that Coudriet presented nine grievances to the 
highest level of review, only two of which mentioned Dr. Saavedra.  These two 
grievances were dismissed at the SOIGA level for procedural default.  Thus, Coudriet has 
failed to exhaust his claims against Dr. Saavedra.  See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230 
(recognizing a procedural default rule in the context of § 1983 claims “because such a 
rule prevents an end-run around the exhaustion requirement, and thereby creates an 
                                                                                                                                                  
requirement of deliberate indifference.”); Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 
1993).   
8
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  
See Giles, 571 F.3d at 322. 
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overwhelming incentive for a prisoner to pursue his claims to the fullest within the 
administrative grievance system.”).9 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented, and we will affirm 
the judgments of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
10
 
                                              
9
 Even if Coudriet’s claims against Dr. Saavedra were properly exhausted, his complaint 
fails to state a cause of action.  He brought claims against Dr. Saavedra for violations of 
his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  
The only potentially cognizable claim Coudriet asserts is for violations of the Eighth 
Amendment.  However, as established above, a claim of misdiagnosis is insufficient to 
support a constitutional violation.  See Singletary, 266 F.3d at 193. 
10
 To the extent that Coudriet asserted state law claims, the District Court correctly 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  See United Mine Workers of Am. v. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before 
trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.”).  Moreover, we agree that 
allowing Coudriet to amend his complaint would be futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview 
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 
